Book Project: Reverence and Critique in Democratic Politics
My project examines how to navigate the tension between two competing desiderata of political life: critical questioning that interrogates regnant conventions in the name of justice, progress, and truth on the one hand, and authoritative, shared sources of meaning on the other. Privileging one at the expense of the other risks producing a civic culture that is either dangerously unstable or oppressively conformist. Nonetheless, the question of how to balance them is one that eludes easy resolution. This is an issue of practical significance in the United States today. Consider, for example, the anti-vaccine movement as an instance of critical questioning gone awry, or the attempt of some state legislatures to restrict the teaching of the sordid aspects of America’s past as a manifestation of an excessive insistence on authority and consensus. I analyze the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey to highlight and evaluate the strategies that each author pursued to make critical thought an asset for democratic politics. I reorient the conversation about how to balance critical questioning with sources of moral and intellectual authority in civic life by emphasizing dispositions of character rather than specific creedal commitments. Based on my exegesis of Tocqueville, Mill, and Dewey, I argue that two related attitudes should moderate the application of critical reason: a sense of humility about the capacity of humans to remake their world as well as a reflective appreciation for the political and cultural institutions that have sustained one’s existence. I draw attention to how Tocqueville’s provocative endorsement of dogmatic beliefs regarding religion and morality frames the issue, how Mill’s atheistic “religion of humanity” falls short, and how Dewey’s concept of “natural piety” severed from ultimate metaphysical foundations holds potential despite its own limitations.
Peer-Reviewed Publications
"Mill on Deference and Democratic Character." Political Research Quarterly. Volume 74, Issue 4. December 2021. 1125-1136. DOI: 10.1177/1065912920970277
Citizens of liberal democracies today increasingly exhibit a distrust of perceived elites, especially experts and those of advanced educational attainment more generally. John Stuart Mill’s work offers potential responses this phenomenon. Mill regards deference to superior wisdom as an essential part of a well-developed character while at the same time esteeming independent thought. Though his emphasis on the importance of character formation is well known, his concern for inculcating a salutary form of deference has been underexplored. I show how Mill’s approaches to this task include redesigning the political process in order to amplify the voice of the highly educated, promoting more widespread opportunities for learning, and consistently emphasizing the partiality of human understanding. I also compare Mill’s treatment of the place of deference in democratic politics to that of Alexis de Tocqueville’s, and consider how Tocqueville might critique Mill’s strategies for cultivating deference. In so doing, I demonstrate how these authors provide us with resources for navigating the tensions between popular sovereignty and expertise, and between independent thought and intellectual authority.
"Tocqueville on Intellectual Independence, Doubt, and Democratic Citizenship." The Review of Politics. Volume 82, Issue 1. Winter 2020. 49-72. DOI:10.1017/S0034670519000780
Some contend that politics functions best with deference to tradition and authoritative community norms, while others argue for independent thought and doubt of received of authority. Insight into this question can be found in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. While Tocqueville is often taken to regard the doubt characteristic of intellectual independence solely as a pathology, I show that he also saw it as potentially providing a precursor to conversation, a stimulus to self-assured conviction, and a counter to distortionary abstractions. Nonetheless, Tocqueville also elaborates the destructive outcomes of too much doubt and intellectual independence. I identify the ways in which he seeks to discipline and educate the drive to independent thought so as to attain its benefits without falling victim to its pathologies. In doing so, I demonstrate how Tocqueville can be a guide to how to navigate the perennial tension between intellectual inquiry and authoritative community norms.
My project examines how to navigate the tension between two competing desiderata of political life: critical questioning that interrogates regnant conventions in the name of justice, progress, and truth on the one hand, and authoritative, shared sources of meaning on the other. Privileging one at the expense of the other risks producing a civic culture that is either dangerously unstable or oppressively conformist. Nonetheless, the question of how to balance them is one that eludes easy resolution. This is an issue of practical significance in the United States today. Consider, for example, the anti-vaccine movement as an instance of critical questioning gone awry, or the attempt of some state legislatures to restrict the teaching of the sordid aspects of America’s past as a manifestation of an excessive insistence on authority and consensus. I analyze the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey to highlight and evaluate the strategies that each author pursued to make critical thought an asset for democratic politics. I reorient the conversation about how to balance critical questioning with sources of moral and intellectual authority in civic life by emphasizing dispositions of character rather than specific creedal commitments. Based on my exegesis of Tocqueville, Mill, and Dewey, I argue that two related attitudes should moderate the application of critical reason: a sense of humility about the capacity of humans to remake their world as well as a reflective appreciation for the political and cultural institutions that have sustained one’s existence. I draw attention to how Tocqueville’s provocative endorsement of dogmatic beliefs regarding religion and morality frames the issue, how Mill’s atheistic “religion of humanity” falls short, and how Dewey’s concept of “natural piety” severed from ultimate metaphysical foundations holds potential despite its own limitations.
Peer-Reviewed Publications
"Mill on Deference and Democratic Character." Political Research Quarterly. Volume 74, Issue 4. December 2021. 1125-1136. DOI: 10.1177/1065912920970277
Citizens of liberal democracies today increasingly exhibit a distrust of perceived elites, especially experts and those of advanced educational attainment more generally. John Stuart Mill’s work offers potential responses this phenomenon. Mill regards deference to superior wisdom as an essential part of a well-developed character while at the same time esteeming independent thought. Though his emphasis on the importance of character formation is well known, his concern for inculcating a salutary form of deference has been underexplored. I show how Mill’s approaches to this task include redesigning the political process in order to amplify the voice of the highly educated, promoting more widespread opportunities for learning, and consistently emphasizing the partiality of human understanding. I also compare Mill’s treatment of the place of deference in democratic politics to that of Alexis de Tocqueville’s, and consider how Tocqueville might critique Mill’s strategies for cultivating deference. In so doing, I demonstrate how these authors provide us with resources for navigating the tensions between popular sovereignty and expertise, and between independent thought and intellectual authority.
"Tocqueville on Intellectual Independence, Doubt, and Democratic Citizenship." The Review of Politics. Volume 82, Issue 1. Winter 2020. 49-72. DOI:10.1017/S0034670519000780
Some contend that politics functions best with deference to tradition and authoritative community norms, while others argue for independent thought and doubt of received of authority. Insight into this question can be found in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. While Tocqueville is often taken to regard the doubt characteristic of intellectual independence solely as a pathology, I show that he also saw it as potentially providing a precursor to conversation, a stimulus to self-assured conviction, and a counter to distortionary abstractions. Nonetheless, Tocqueville also elaborates the destructive outcomes of too much doubt and intellectual independence. I identify the ways in which he seeks to discipline and educate the drive to independent thought so as to attain its benefits without falling victim to its pathologies. In doing so, I demonstrate how Tocqueville can be a guide to how to navigate the perennial tension between intellectual inquiry and authoritative community norms.
