Dissertation Project: Tocqueville and Mill on Doubt and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship
Many contemporary democratic theorists agree that a willingness to think critically about authority constitutes a desirable disposition for citizens. Yet while this quality may be salutary, it is not always or necessarily so. An excess of skepticism can corrode the foundations of social order. I turn to Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill to understand better the conditions under which skepticism can be a constructive rather than corrosive force for democratic politics. My investigation demonstrates that both authors thought, albeit for different reasons, that a proclivity to independent-mindedness and critical thinking was in some way endogenous to democracy as a regime type. I also show that Tocqueville’s approach to disciplining and directing this tendency focused mainly on cultivating and preserving dogmatic beliefs and encouraging political participation, while Mill emphasized the direct leadership of intellectuals and the power of aesthetic culture. In addition to adding to our understanding of Tocqueville and Mill, this project also addresses unanswered questions that contemporary democratic theory raises.
Articles and Working Papers
"Tocqueville on Intellectual Independence and Its Limits in Democracy" (Revise and Resubmit at The Review of Politics)
The tension between intellectual inquiry and authoritative community norms has been a theme in Western political thought since its founding in Ancient Athens. We can gain insights into this problem by considering Tocqueville’s account of democratic peoples’ tendency to independent-mindedness. His analysis offers three contributions. First, he demonstrates how what he calls “the democratic social state” both engenders and constrains this tendency to intellectual independence. Second, he elaborates pathological outcomes that the democratic pursuit of intellectual independence can generate if pursued in a manner not mindful of reason’s limits. Third, he details correctives that can mediate this tendency so that its positive potential can be enjoyed. Considering Tocqueville’s thoughts on intellectual independence helps us better understand how the dispositions our political system engenders may be in tension with those that it needs. It also suggests that the preservation of self-government requires tempered expectations about the proper ambit of individual reason.
Many contemporary democratic theorists agree that a willingness to think critically about authority constitutes a desirable disposition for citizens. Yet while this quality may be salutary, it is not always or necessarily so. An excess of skepticism can corrode the foundations of social order. I turn to Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill to understand better the conditions under which skepticism can be a constructive rather than corrosive force for democratic politics. My investigation demonstrates that both authors thought, albeit for different reasons, that a proclivity to independent-mindedness and critical thinking was in some way endogenous to democracy as a regime type. I also show that Tocqueville’s approach to disciplining and directing this tendency focused mainly on cultivating and preserving dogmatic beliefs and encouraging political participation, while Mill emphasized the direct leadership of intellectuals and the power of aesthetic culture. In addition to adding to our understanding of Tocqueville and Mill, this project also addresses unanswered questions that contemporary democratic theory raises.
Articles and Working Papers
"Tocqueville on Intellectual Independence and Its Limits in Democracy" (Revise and Resubmit at The Review of Politics)
The tension between intellectual inquiry and authoritative community norms has been a theme in Western political thought since its founding in Ancient Athens. We can gain insights into this problem by considering Tocqueville’s account of democratic peoples’ tendency to independent-mindedness. His analysis offers three contributions. First, he demonstrates how what he calls “the democratic social state” both engenders and constrains this tendency to intellectual independence. Second, he elaborates pathological outcomes that the democratic pursuit of intellectual independence can generate if pursued in a manner not mindful of reason’s limits. Third, he details correctives that can mediate this tendency so that its positive potential can be enjoyed. Considering Tocqueville’s thoughts on intellectual independence helps us better understand how the dispositions our political system engenders may be in tension with those that it needs. It also suggests that the preservation of self-government requires tempered expectations about the proper ambit of individual reason.
