Book Project: Reverence and Critique in Democratic Politics
My project examines the dispositions of character requisite to critique and reimagine democracy. This issue is timely because democracy is in an apparent state of crisis today. However, while the issue is a timely one, it is also at the core of politics founded on the consent of the governed. The Declaration of Independence states that when a government fails to secure people’s fundamental rights, “it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it; and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their happiness.” This statement affirms the perennial necessity of revisiting how we organize collective life. I turn to two of the most famous analysts of American democracy, and of democracy more generally, as resources for this investigation: the 19th century French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville and the 20th century American philosopher John Dewey. Based on my reading of these thinkers, I argue that the following intellectual dispositions are requisite for the successful reimagining of democracy: A critical attitude that we are able to turn on our own convictions as well as on the established structures of social life, a sense of the power of collective human endeavors and a commitment to build better for those who come after us coupled with a humility about the capacity of people to remake the world, and an orientation towards the future that coexists with a reflective appreciation of the achievements of past generations. In addition to advancing original interpretations of Tocqueville and Dewey, this project contributes to conversations in democratic theory, and in particular Hélène Landemore, Danielle Allen, and Sheldon Wolin’s efforts to formulate new paradigms of democratic politics.
Peer-Reviewed Publications
"Mill on Deference and Democratic Character." Political Research Quarterly. Volume 74, Issue 4. December 2021. 1125-1136. DOI: 10.1177/1065912920970277
Citizens of liberal democracies today increasingly exhibit a distrust of perceived elites, especially experts and those of advanced educational attainment more generally. John Stuart Mill’s work offers potential responses this phenomenon. Mill regards deference to superior wisdom as an essential part of a well-developed character while at the same time esteeming independent thought. Though his emphasis on the importance of character formation is well known, his concern for inculcating a salutary form of deference has been underexplored. I show how Mill’s approaches to this task include redesigning the political process in order to amplify the voice of the highly educated, promoting more widespread opportunities for learning, and consistently emphasizing the partiality of human understanding. I also compare Mill’s treatment of the place of deference in democratic politics to that of Alexis de Tocqueville’s, and consider how Tocqueville might critique Mill’s strategies for cultivating deference. In so doing, I demonstrate how these authors provide us with resources for navigating the tensions between popular sovereignty and expertise, and between independent thought and intellectual authority.
"Tocqueville on Intellectual Independence, Doubt, and Democratic Citizenship." The Review of Politics. Volume 82, Issue 1. Winter 2020. 49-72. DOI:10.1017/S0034670519000780
Some contend that politics functions best with deference to tradition and authoritative community norms, while others argue for independent thought and doubt of received of authority. Insight into this question can be found in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. While Tocqueville is often taken to regard the doubt characteristic of intellectual independence solely as a pathology, I show that he also saw it as potentially providing a precursor to conversation, a stimulus to self-assured conviction, and a counter to distortionary abstractions. Nonetheless, Tocqueville also elaborates the destructive outcomes of too much doubt and intellectual independence. I identify the ways in which he seeks to discipline and educate the drive to independent thought so as to attain its benefits without falling victim to its pathologies. In doing so, I demonstrate how Tocqueville can be a guide to how to navigate the perennial tension between intellectual inquiry and authoritative community norms.
My project examines the dispositions of character requisite to critique and reimagine democracy. This issue is timely because democracy is in an apparent state of crisis today. However, while the issue is a timely one, it is also at the core of politics founded on the consent of the governed. The Declaration of Independence states that when a government fails to secure people’s fundamental rights, “it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it; and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their happiness.” This statement affirms the perennial necessity of revisiting how we organize collective life. I turn to two of the most famous analysts of American democracy, and of democracy more generally, as resources for this investigation: the 19th century French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville and the 20th century American philosopher John Dewey. Based on my reading of these thinkers, I argue that the following intellectual dispositions are requisite for the successful reimagining of democracy: A critical attitude that we are able to turn on our own convictions as well as on the established structures of social life, a sense of the power of collective human endeavors and a commitment to build better for those who come after us coupled with a humility about the capacity of people to remake the world, and an orientation towards the future that coexists with a reflective appreciation of the achievements of past generations. In addition to advancing original interpretations of Tocqueville and Dewey, this project contributes to conversations in democratic theory, and in particular Hélène Landemore, Danielle Allen, and Sheldon Wolin’s efforts to formulate new paradigms of democratic politics.
Peer-Reviewed Publications
"Mill on Deference and Democratic Character." Political Research Quarterly. Volume 74, Issue 4. December 2021. 1125-1136. DOI: 10.1177/1065912920970277
Citizens of liberal democracies today increasingly exhibit a distrust of perceived elites, especially experts and those of advanced educational attainment more generally. John Stuart Mill’s work offers potential responses this phenomenon. Mill regards deference to superior wisdom as an essential part of a well-developed character while at the same time esteeming independent thought. Though his emphasis on the importance of character formation is well known, his concern for inculcating a salutary form of deference has been underexplored. I show how Mill’s approaches to this task include redesigning the political process in order to amplify the voice of the highly educated, promoting more widespread opportunities for learning, and consistently emphasizing the partiality of human understanding. I also compare Mill’s treatment of the place of deference in democratic politics to that of Alexis de Tocqueville’s, and consider how Tocqueville might critique Mill’s strategies for cultivating deference. In so doing, I demonstrate how these authors provide us with resources for navigating the tensions between popular sovereignty and expertise, and between independent thought and intellectual authority.
"Tocqueville on Intellectual Independence, Doubt, and Democratic Citizenship." The Review of Politics. Volume 82, Issue 1. Winter 2020. 49-72. DOI:10.1017/S0034670519000780
Some contend that politics functions best with deference to tradition and authoritative community norms, while others argue for independent thought and doubt of received of authority. Insight into this question can be found in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. While Tocqueville is often taken to regard the doubt characteristic of intellectual independence solely as a pathology, I show that he also saw it as potentially providing a precursor to conversation, a stimulus to self-assured conviction, and a counter to distortionary abstractions. Nonetheless, Tocqueville also elaborates the destructive outcomes of too much doubt and intellectual independence. I identify the ways in which he seeks to discipline and educate the drive to independent thought so as to attain its benefits without falling victim to its pathologies. In doing so, I demonstrate how Tocqueville can be a guide to how to navigate the perennial tension between intellectual inquiry and authoritative community norms.